South Caucasian and Central Asian countries gained their independence in 1991, after the disintegration of the USSR. Although, there was [and is still] heavy pressure and influence of Russia on these state, those especially South Caucasian states began to pursue independent foreign policy.
At this period, Turkey began to involve actively in these region. Initially, Turkey approached to three South Caucasian States equally but later occupation of 20% of Azerbaijani territory by Armenians and the claims of so-called Armenian Genocide in 1915 lead Turkey to severe diplomatic relation with Armenia. Nevertheless, Turkey strengthened it ties with other remaining states specifically with Georgia and Azerbaijan. Besides Turkey shares close historical, cultural (except Georgia) and economic ties with the countries of the region, has more than economic interests but also carries a responsibility to support these nations in their social and economic development.
Turkey as a regional power began to participate in decision-making process of South Caucasus under Monopolar International System. Taking into consideration that Turkey is strategic partner of the solely superpower the United States, taking into consideration of emerging national Interest of the U.S. in south Caucasus, taking into consideration of eagerness of South Caucasian states to integrate into Euro-Atlantic Structure, Turkey role and importance in eyes of the U.S. and South Caucasus. This paper focus on oil and gas project that involve Turkey to tighten and strengthen it ties with Azerbaijan and Georgian and further Central Asian states. I am going to find answer the question what are the factors force Turkey to integrate with the states of South Caucasus and possibly with Central Asian states? What a role Turkey plays in these regions?
Turkey is an important energy player due to its geographical position between Middle East and Caspian Region on one hand, and one of the biggest and increasing energy consuming markets on the other1. Here, Middle East is a volatile region and the future is uncertain. Besides Turkey almost the whole of natural gas (65% from Russia and 20% From Iran2) which makes 15% of total energy consumption of Turkey and 90% of oil nearly responds half of Turkey’s energy consumption3. In order to reduce Turkey’s dependencies on Middle East and Russia and as well as to benefit form its geopolitical position and to become an hub for European Union, Turkey needs alternative projects which is to guarantee affordable, secure and uninterrupted flow of hydrocarbon resources from alternative resources to Europe and beyond. Moreover, diversification, secure flow and cost-affectivity in energy supply are crucial for Turkey. In this way, Caspian basin raw oil and natural gas will provide Turkey and Europe with an alternative source, independent from the Middle East region and Russia. By doing so, Turkey will serve for its security of supply and will diminish the affect of decreasing energy supply from Russia or Iran because of political reasons. Thus, Turkey supported the series of pipeline projects on agenda which is originated from Caspian Basin mainly from Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan through Turkey to Europe4.
As a result, the concept of diversification of energy supply is not still achieved as it is expected, nevertheless there is considerable development. For instance, Turkey imports natural gas from Russia, Iran, Algeria, Nigeria and Azerbaijan. And following natural gas projects are proof of diversification: Blue Stream (Supplied by Russia), Iran-Turkey pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline are in operation; Turkey-Greece interconnector which is planned to fulfil he pipeline with Caspian Basin natural gas is under construction; Nabucco and Egypt-Turkey pipeline is remaining as proposal; and only is Trans-Caspian pipeline cancelled because of Russian strong opposition which is aimed to involve Turkmenistan natural gas to transport to the West bypassing Russia5.
Additionally, Turkey’s energy demand has been grown by 6% per year in last decades and recent forecast recorded that this tendency will go on as a result of rapid urbanization and industrialization6. Ad it is expected to meet 220 million tons of oil equivalent in 2020 which is means 150% increase in comparison with current figure7.
The great amount of gas reserve in Turkmenistan established very appropriate situation to transform from historical rivalry to cooperation of Turkey’s and Iran’s relations. As a result, Iran proposed a comprehensive and gas pipeline project in 1995 which targeted to carry gas from Turkmenistan, though Iran, to Turkey and further European gas markets. The project planned to complete at least 4 and at most 8 years with the capacity of 28 billion cubic meter (bcm) gas per year which 18 bcm for the Turkish market and 10 bcm for the European market8. The project cancelled due to the U.S. sanction on Iran’ energy sector which was banned to invest on Iran’s energy sector more that $40 million USD in 1996. This sanction prevented the foreign companies to invest the implementation of the project. But nevertheless, the further deterioration of the U.S.-Iran relations and the policy of realizing multiple pipelines fro the export of Caspian oil and gas led the U.S. to support the oil and gas pipelines that bringing Turkmen gas and Kazakh oil to Baku, Azerbaijan though Turkey to world markets9. That is why, any policy changes on Caspian basin oil and gas did not affect on Turkey initially, but later, the situation changes against Turkey.
Nabucco is one of the major projects that will have significant political, economic and social affects on involved states and those who against to this project in case of its realization. It is aimed to bring natural gas of Azerbaijan and possible gas of Turkmenistan to Erzurum, Turkey. Why to Erzurum? Because there is distribution system of Turkey that make possible bringing gas to Austria via Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. In framework of this project, Turkey proposed Azerbaijan that you sell your gas to us at border and then we sell it as our gas from another side of our border. Of course, Azerbaijan has not approved this proposal that is why the agreement was not signed during “4th Energy Summit” in Baku which was held 14 November in 2008. But contrary to this, new project called “new ‘Sarmati’ signed which is elaborating the necessary conditions for exploitation of the Odessa-Brody-Plotck-Gdansk oil pipeline”10. But there is still a hope for realization of Nabucco: as stated in article 12 of the declaration of 4th Energy Summit in Baku:
Agree to continue the efforts for coordination of activities of the parties in realization of the joint projects directed to the strengthening of energy security of Europe, especially gas transit projects, including those across the territories of Georgia and Turkey, including ITGI, Nabucco, and others.11
The realization of Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline provides development and investment opportunities for underdeveloped eastern regions of Turkey. Additionally, as Brenda Shaffer argued the main advantage of becoming energy transit hub is a political one12. Turkey strengthens and facilitates its European integration by serving as transport corridor for Europe. At the same time, these projects make states of South Caucasus to enjoy in their sovereign power and foreign policy more independent from Russia. But Brenda Shaffer argues that Turkey such policy is risky because European Union has not concluded that whether it needs significant diversification of its energy supply or not13. On the other hand, Turkey can benefit by establishing good economic and political relations with Russia which is also recorded some positive interaction over last decades14.
All of these energy projects that directly link and make states interdependent to each other which further require collaboration of these states in security, defence area in order to protect from terrorist attack. Later these states establish a regional alliance, such as Turkey, Azerbaijan and Georgia practicing15. It gives an opportunity to Turkey to make a stronghold in the region that Turkey has lost it since 18th century. This in return makes easy for turkey to re-establish and preserve its ties with Central Asian Turkic States.
Oil and Natural gas projects as a part Turkey’s energy policy should conceptualize in framework of Turkey’s foreign and security policy. And the issues related energy should be coordinated among political and bureaucratic agencies in order to integrate energy policy into Turkey’s foreign and security policy. Because European interest in diversification of supply possible could have either positive or negative affect on Turkey. It can help and foster Turkey to overcome the uncertainties in energy sector by insuring the well-functioning of its energy policy in the context of Turkey’s foreign and security policy
Endnotes
1. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey “Turkey's Energy Strategy”, June 2006. Available at http://www.econturk.org/Turkisheconomy/energy_turkey.pdf 03/01/2009
2. Turkey Analyst, 23 April 2008 “Between Political Crises: Turkish Energy Policy”, available at
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2008/080423B.html 04/01/2009
3. TUSIAD Publications, “An Overview of Turkey’s Energy Strategy”, available at http://www.tusiad.us/Content/uploaded/ENERGYOVERVIEW.PDF 04/01/2009
4. Turkey Analyst, 23 April 2008 “Between Political Crises: Turkish Energy Policy”, available at
http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/turkey/2008/080423B.html 04/01/2009
5. International Strategic Research Organization publication “Energy Review”, Issue: 1, Date: 08.01.2007. Available at http://www.econturk.org/Turkisheconomy/energy_turkey.pdf 03/01/2009
6. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Turkey “Turkey's Energy Strategy”, June 2006. Available at http://www.econturk.org/Turkisheconomy/energy_turkey.pdf 03/01/2009
7. Ibid
8. Martha Brill Olcott, “International Gas Trade in Central Asia: Turkmenistan, Iran, Russia and Afghanistan” p. 11. Available at http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/GAS_InternationalGasTradeinCentralAsia.pdf
9. Ibid. pp.15-16
10. The Declaration of the 4th Baku Energy Summit, available at http://www.today.az/news/business/49015.html 05/01/2009
11. Ibid.
12. Brenda Shaffer, “Turkey’s Energy Policies in a Tight Global Energy Markets” available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/784/turkeys_energy_policies_in_a_tight_global_energy_market.html
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
* Gani Nasirov is fourth year student of International Relations at Qafqaz University